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Abstract
This paper proposes to incorporate product customization in the Maskin and Riley
(1984) nonlinear pricing model in order to capture major features of mobile service
data. In particular, consumers are characterized by a two-dimensional type. One di-
mension is observed by the provider and integrates product customization, while the
other is a standard parameter of adverse selection, which is unobserved by the provider
and makes it necessary for the provider to discriminate among consumers with differ-
ent tastes through nonlinear pricing. We then propose a novel method to aggregate
the multiple-dimensional voice consumption into one-dimensional index. We show that
the model structure is identified under the following conditions: The marginal utility
function is multiplicatively separable in consumers’ tastes, and consumers’ observed
and unobserved heterogeneity are independent. Empirical results show that both di-
mensions of heterogeneity are important. Due to asymmetric information, 50% of the
"second-best" social welfare is left "on the table" in order to screen heterogeneous con-
sumers. Moreover, if costly product customization does not affect subscribers’ utility,
20% of subscribers would not be served.
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A commodity is a good or a service completely specified physically, temporally, and spatially.
– Debreu (1959)
1 Introduction
Nowadays, modern technology is starting another era of customized mass production.
The telecommunication industry is one of the first entering this era. While a traditional
landline phone only allows users to talk to each other through a fixed telephone line, mobile
service now enables seamless phone calls even when users are moving around wide areas.
Through cellular sites and mobile-services switching centers, providers can get phone call
services delivered whenever and wherever they are needed. This has dramatically increased
the variety of services which can be provided. In addition, mobile service providers typically
offer complex nonlinear tariffs. For example, when a consumer chooses a plan with a higher
monthly fee, he usually gets a lower minute rate, more free services, a lower rate for minutes
beyond the free quota and no peak-time call charge.
In this paper, we develop a bidimensional screening model to explain the observed voice
consumptions and payments relying on the Maskin and Riley (1984) model. A monopoly
mobile service provider has a technological infrastructure that allows consumers to customize
their own services and use them in various quantities. In the market we study, the provider
provides a full range of different kinds of voice service that can be temporally and spatially
categorized. A particular combination represents a variety of mobile service. We assume that
a customer’s need for a certain variety of service is determined exogenously by his lifestyle and
is observed by the monopolist. This assumption is consistent with the product customization
literature (see, e.g., Bernhardt, Liu, and Serfes (2007)) and also real-life practice.1 Hereafter,
we call the variety variable location for convenience. It is any characteristic of the consumer
that is observed by both the provider and the consumer but not observed by the analyst.
We introduce a second dimension of consumer heterogeneity, i.e., the consumer’ taste for
mobile voice service, which is unobserved by the provider. Therefore, to maximize profit,
the provider needs to discriminate among consumers with different tastes through nonlinear
pricing. To summarize, we assume that consumers are heterogeneous along two dimensions.
Namely, they are located on a segment, so that they are identified by their positions, and
they also differ in their tastes. The former is observed by the provider while the latter is
not.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several dimensions. First, it offers a
1For example, while a phone is turned on, its geographical location can be easily determined by calculating
the differences in time for a signal to travel from the mobile phone to each of several cellular towers nearby.
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methodology to incorporate product customization into a nonlinear pricing model, thereby
allowing for an (endogenous) continuous price schedule despite the discrete number of basic
plans. Up to now, several papers have empirically analyzed nonlinear pricing using discrete
choice models while considering exogenous price schedules. See, e.g., Leslie (2004) for broad-
way theatre tickets, McManus (2007) for speciality coffee, and Cohen (2008) for paper towel,
Mostly related to our paper, Miravete (2002), Miravete and Röller (2004), Economides,
Seim, and Viard (2008) and Seim and Viard (2010) study nonlinear pricing in local tele-
phone service and mobile service industry. We propose to use a continuous framework when
the large number of varieties stemming from product customization makes discrete choice
models intractable.2 On one hand, the choice set approximates a continuum of choices when
the number of varieties is large enough. On the other hand, product customization can
be understood as bundling of a large number of services. By the Law of Large Numbers,
multiple taste parameters (typically implied by multiple services) even out in large bundles,
which means that one only needs to consider the systematic difference (for example, income)
across consumers.
Second, we propose a method to aggregate a multiple-dimensional variable into an one-
dimensional index and we show how the parameters in the aggregation function are identified.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to construct such an index without data on
another variable (which is a function of the index) or making parametric assumptions on the
unobserved variables. In the former case with additional data, the weights can be estimated
by projecting the variable on the various characteristics or consumptions. For example,
to aggregate the various food categories, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) derive the weights by
projecting the (estimated) permanent income on the quantities consumed of various types of
foods. To aggregate characteristics of houses into an one-dimensional quality index, Murphy
(2007) assumes that the price of a house is a function of its quality index and derive weights
by projecting the price on the house characteristics. In the latter case with parametric
assumptions on the unobservable variables, the weights can be estimated by maximizing the
log likelihood of the data as a function of all the parameters. For example, many empirical
studies of production relationships are based on aggregate indexes of capital and labor inputs.
Sankar (1970) utilizes a CES production function with a normal distributed error term and
estimates the parameters using maximum likelihood. In our case, the multiple-dimensional
voice consumptions are aggregated according to a Cobb-Douglas function. The difficulty is
how to estimate the weights in the Cobb-Douglas function while estimating the distribution
of the unobservable variables nonparametrically without additional data. Obviously the
2For example, the multinomial probit/logit model becomes computationally infeasible with too many
alternatives. In addition, the nested multinomial logit model depends on strong assumptions.
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previous two approaches do not apply to our case. Instead, we exploit the independence
between the two unobserved variables to show that the weights are identified.
Third, our paper contributes to the growing literature on the mobile service industry.
See Gruber (2005) for an excellent survey. It is worthnoting that the previous literature
relies heavily on parametric specifications of the model. For example, using data from
an experiment by the South Central Bell, Miravete (2002) constructs a fully parametric
principal-agent model which provides closed-form solutions. Using data from a mobile service
provider in an Asian country, Kim, Telang, Vogt, and Krishnan (2010) assume a quadratic
utility function and normally distributed error terms. In this paper, we investigate the
nonparametric identification of the utility function and type distribution from the observed
consumptions and payments. This allows us to draw policy conclusions that are robust to
functional misspecification. Moreover, in a preference-based structural model, consumers are
assumed to be heterogeneous. In this kind of empirical analysis, individual-level data are
preferred. However, they have been less available to researchers. For example, the efficiency
of the estimates in Miravete and Röller (2004) is confined by the lack of information on
individual consumptions. In this paper, we have individual-level data on more than 20,000
subscribers of a mobile service provider in China.
Fourth, our paper builds on the literature on contract models with incomplete informa-
tion. Some papers focus on one-dimensional context. See, e.g., Perrigne and Vuong (2011a).
Recently, several empirical studies document the implications of multidimensional hetero-
geneity in insurance market. See, e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Cohen and
Einav (2007). In view of this, Aryal, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009) study the identification
of insurance models with multidimensional screening. Another strand of literature studies
the implicatoins of sequentially revealed bidimensional consumer type. See, e.g., Miravete
(2002) and Miravete (2005) in the context of telecommunication. In this paper, we remark
that mobile service subscribers are characterized by both their (unobserved) taste and (ob-
served) location. Thus, we employ a bidimensional screening model which boils down to a
series of one-dimensional screening model. We study its identification in the spirit of Guerre,
Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Perrigne and Vuong (2011a).
Lastly, our paper contributes to the growing management literature on product cus-
tomization. Product customization relates to the ability of providing individually designed
products and services to every customer through a high process flexibility and integration
as defined by Da Silveira, Borenstein, and Fogliatto (2001). Since the seminal paper of
Thisse and Vives (1988), the Hotelling’s spatial competition model has been used exten-
sively to study product customization. See, e.g., Dewan, Jing, and Seidmann (2000), Chen
and Iyer (2002) and Dewan, Jing, and Seidmann (2003). However, they mainly focus on
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manufacturing operations. There are still few studies dealing with product customization
in service operations. Hereafter, we consider perfect product customization in the mobile
service industry using a nonlinear pricing model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data with a particular
attention to aspects that are incorporated in the model. Section 3 presents the model.
Identification and estimation are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the estimation
results and some counterfactuals. Section 6 concludes with future lines of research.
2 Mobile Phone Data
We collected data on voice consumptions and payments of subscribers to a mobile service
provider in a major metropolitan area of China for the billing period of May 2009. Among
the three mobile service providers allowed to operate in this area, the firm from which we
obtained the data has 72% of the mobile subscribers. It provides mobile service under three
brands, each of which has a specific target market: One for students, one for rural residents
and one for business people and others. We focus on the latter, which holds an even higher
market share. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the firm acts as a monopolist in this
market segment.
The firm proposes a new menu of plans every year. A menu usually consists of a basic
plan list and many add-on plan lists. In May 2009, eight basic plans were offered. Consumers
can change their plans every month at no additional cost. Whenever an existing customer
wants to change his plan or a new customer wants to join one, he can only choose from the
currently proposed menu. Since it is optional for the existing customers to change to a new
plan, there is still a certain proportion of them using old ones. We focus on the customers
who subscribed to the eight basic plans offered in May 2009, which gives a sample with more
than 20,000 observations.
Each basic plan specifies a monthly fee, a free quota of minutes, a price schedule beyond
the free quota and so on. When a subscriber chooses a plan, he pays a monthly fee and is
allowed to use a free quota of voice minutes. The free quota is limited to certain kinds of
phone calls. Once he uses up the free quota, he incurs a constant price for overtime minutes.
The basic plans distinguish outgoing and incoming calls according to the position of the
subscribers when the calls are made as shown in Table 1. For example, A is the outgoing
call minutes used by consumers when they are in the city.
We observe consumers’ voice service consumptions of A, D, (B+C) and (E+F ) measured
in the number of minutes and their total bills in May 2009.3 Table 2 contains some summary
3There is very little consumption of international calls, which account for less than 0.2% of the total
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statistics. The average bill is 182.49 RMB ($26.72 US dollars). While accounting for 8% of
the subscribers, this market segment contributes to 20% of the revenue. Subscribers mainly
stay in the home city. Hence they consume 5 times more local call minutes than roaming
minutes. Slightly less incoming call minutes are consumed than outgoing call minutes. We
also calculate the number of days since their subscription dates. An average of 28 billing
periods shows the loyalty of subscribers.
The firm implements nonlinear pricing across and within basic plans. First, as one moves
from a cheaper plan to a more expensive one, the ratio of the monthly fee to free minutes
decreases with the overtime rates decreasing, more add-ons are offered free and more types of
incoming calls becoming free. Second, besides the basic plan list, there are many add-on plan
lists. Some add-on plan lists give quantity discounts for certain kinds of calls. Third, there
are continuous promotion events. Usually, deeper discounts are offered to the customers who
consume more. Fourth, there is a bonus credit accumulation program. The accumulation
rate is higher for the customers who consume more. Bonus credits can be redeemed for
account balance, add-on plans or gifts. It is worth noting that almost all discounts are given
to different levels of payments rather than combinations of calls. On one hand, this suggests
that there is a mapping from consumers’ willingness to pay to payments. On the other hand,
it suggests that there is no implicit ranking of "quality" among different kinds of calls. If
there were, discounts should be offered to those who consume more calls with high "quality",
which is not the case in our data.
The firm can customize its services perfectly and melds the customized services with
corresponding prices. First, it has the best nationwide coverage and provides a full range of
phone call services.4 Thus, the firm can deliver services whenever and whereever they are
needed. Customers can customize their own services according to their needs. Second, with
the help of its computer system, the mobile service provider implements the price schedule
based on where, when and how subscribers consume. For each phone call, the phone numbers,
location and networks of the two end nodes, starting time, ending time and duration are
recorded. Rates change with all the features of the call, such as the location of the initiator
and receiver, the length of the call, the time of the day, the day of the week and so on.
However, the analyst does not observe all the temporal and spacial features of a phone call
except the total duration for several categories. On the other hand, for consumers consuming
the same quantities, the difference in their payments reflects their different locations. To see
how heterogeneous consumes are in their locations, we sample consumers whose payments
consumption. To simplify the analysis, we add it to A. Following Kim, Telang, Vogt, and Krishnan (2010),
we drop the observations whose total minutes are less than 10. We also drop the observations whose payments
are less than 2.01 units or more than 1000 units, which account for less than 0.4% of the final sample.
4For example, roaming is not available to subscribers of certain plans of other brands.
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fall into chosen bins. Table 3 presents the summary statistics of total minutes and payment.
While the standard deviation of payment is controlled to be small in each bin, consumers’
consumption of total minutes has a significantly higher variation.
Several features of the mobile service data will be incorporated in our model. First,
we will aggregate the observed four-dimensional voice consumption into an one-dimensional
index. We argue that consumers’ decision is one-dimensional. From the consumers’ point
of view, if their decision is along all dimensions, no "free lunch" should be left on the table
and cheaper services should be consumed more. However, this is not the case in our data.
A large proportion of subscribers did not use their free minutes. If a consumer pays the
monthly fee, his first usage of B +C + F is free. We compare subscribers’ free minutes and
actual usage. Since we can not back out E from data on (A,D,B + C,E + F ), we assume
B
E
= B+C
E+F
5 and calculate B+C+F
FreeMinutes
for each consumer. More than 75% of observations are
less than 1, 62% are less than 0.75 and 44% are less than 0.50. Moreover, cheaper calls are
not consumed more. While incoming calls are always cheaper than outgoing calls, Table 2
shows that the average consumption of D is 473.44 minutes, which is even lower than the
average consumption of A, 518.87 minutes. The consumption of E + F is also lower than
B+C. Hence, the decision to consume at certain time and place is determined exogenously
by the consumers’ lifestyle. From the monopolist’s point of view, if the decision of consumers
is along all dimensions, he should offer discounts along those dimensions to maximize his
profit. For example, in the basic plan, the monopolist could have specified a monthly fee and
a free quota for each kind of call. Instead, it specifies only a total monthly fee and a total
free quota. Moreover, almost all discounts are given to different levels of payments, which is
one dimensional. In sum, consumers only decide on one dimension based on their tastes.
Second, we use a continuous framework. Specifically, we consider that the price schedule
offered by the monopolist is continuous. In our data, voice consumptions are continuous
while the number of basic plans is less than 10. According to our conversations with sev-
eral employees in this firm, there are literally thousands of codes which represent different
discounts offered to consumers. Consumers using the same basic plan can be further dis-
criminated by the nonlinear pricing specification of add-on plans, continuous promotions and
bonus credit accumulation program. Thus, the firm can and does offer a large number of
plans to approximate a continuous price schedule, which leaves no room for pooling.
Third, we assume that the firm’s total cost function is separable across consumers with a
fixed term.6. Mobile service is a good example of information goods. On one hand, providing
5This is assuming that the proportion of incoming and outgoing calls are the same when the consumer
is roaming in or outside of his home province.
6Sundararajan (2004) intepretes it as transaction cost. In contrast, Perrigne and Vuong (2011a) assume
a cost function for the total production in the context of yellow pages. We note that their total cost function
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mobile telephone service to a customer, the variable cost of producing an additional unit of
service is small. On the other hand, the most important cost is building mobile phone base
stations. These stations have limited capacities which are used as long as a subscriber’s
cellular phone is open. Hence, the cost depends mainly on how many subscribers it serves,
rather than how many minutes subscribers use.
Fourth, we assume that consumers know their types well for two reasons. On one hand,
they can change their plans every month at no additional cost. On the other hand, most of
them have been subscribed to this firm for a long time. Table 2 presents the average number
of days since they first subscribed to the firm. On average, they have been subscribed for
more than 840 days, which correspond to more than 28 months. After this long period of
"learning", it is reasonable to assume that the consumers know their types perfectly well.
3 Model
Our model builds on Maskin and Riley (1984). A monopoly sells mobile voice service that
may be customized into different varieties (in other words, delivered to different locations)
and used by customers in varying quantities. A consumer is characterized by a pair (θ, ).
The term θ is his taste for voice service which is known only to him. The term  is his
location. It actually represents all the consumer heterogeneity which is known both to the
monopolist and the consumer.7 Assume that (θ, ) is distributed as Φ(·, ·) with a continuous
density φ(·, ·) on support [θ, θ]× [, ], 0 ≤ θ < θ <∞ and 0 ≤  <  <∞.
The utility function of a consumer of type (θ, ) takes the form
∫ q
0
v(z; θ, )dz − τ(q; ),
where q is the quantity of voice services purchased and τ (q; ) is the total payment for q
units of voice service when his location is .
The monopolist chooses optimally the function q (·, ·) and τ (·; ·) to maximize its profit.
The function q(·, ·) is defined on
[
θ, θ
]
× [, ]. We assume for the moment that for given
, q(·, ) is a strictly increasing function on [θ, θ]. Later, we will show that with additional
assumptions the resulting optimal q(·, ) is a strictly increasing function. For each  ∈ [, ],
the payment τ (·; ) is defined on
[
0, q
(
θ, 
)]
. The monopolist’s profit can be written as
and our separable cost function are nonnested.
7In a version of Hotelling’s spatial competition model, Bernhardt, Liu, and Serfes (2007) study the
investment decisions on customization technology. In their model, consumers are characterized by two
attributes: Spatial locations and brand name preference. The former is interpreted as the customizable
dimension while the latter is non-customizable. To make comparision with Bernhardt, Liu, and Serfes
(2007), the two attribute dimensions in our model are both customizable.
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∫ θ
θ
∫ 

[τ(q(θ, ); )− c(q(θ, ); )]φ(θ, )dθd,
where c(q(θ, ); ) is the the cost for producing q(θ, ) to serve a consumer at location .
The revelation principle ensures that the monopolist can restrict its attention to a direct
mechanism. Moreover, since there is no asymmetric information on , the monopolist’s profit
is maximized if and only if it is maximized for each subpopulation with the same . Hence
the monopolist’s profit maximization problem boils down to a series of profit maximization
problems: for any  ∈ [, ],
max
q(·,),T (·;)
∫ θ
θ
[τ(q(θ, ); )− c(q(θ, ); )]φ(θ|)dθ
over all (q(·, ), τ(·; )) that satisfies incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality
(IR) constraints: for any θ ∈ [θ, θ],
(IC) : θ = arg max
x∈[θ,θ]
∫ q(x,)
0
v(z; θ, )dz − τ(q(x, ); ),
(IR) : 0 ≤
∫ q(θ,)
0
v(z; θ, )dz − τ(q(θ, ); ).
The IC constraint says that "telling the truth" is optimal for every subscriber. Some
remarks on the IR constraint are in order here. We follow Miravete (2002) and assume that
the outside option gives the same utility to every subscriber. From a theoretical perspective,
we avoid countervailing incentives as studied by Lewis and Sappington (1989) and Maggi
and Rodriguez-Clare (1995). From an empirical perspective, this reflects that the outside
option provides low utility because consumers have exogenous variety needs. To a mobile
service subscriber, his outside option is using a fixed-line phone or phone booth to make
calls and not getting incoming calls when away from a fixed-line phone. It is extremely
inconvenient. To summarize, when the outside option provides low utility to everyone, even
if there is variation, it is a valid first-order approximation to assume that it is the same to
everyone.
The following assumptions are made on v(q; θ, ).
Assumption A1: The marginal utility function v(·; ·, ·) is continuously differentiable on
[0,+∞)× [θ, θ]× [, ], and ∀q ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] and ∀ ∈ [, ]
(i) v(q; θ, ) > 0,
(ii) v1(q; θ, ) < 0,
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(iii) v2(q; θ, ) > 0,
(iv) v22(q; θ, ) ≤ 0,
(v) ∂
∂θ
{−v1(q;θ,)
v(q;θ,)
}
≤ 0,
(vi) c11(q;)
c1(q;) >
v1(q;θ,)
v(q;θ,) ,
(vii) ∂
∂θ
{
1−Φ(θ|)
φ(θ|)
}
≤ 0.
Assumption A1-(i) says that the marginal utility is always positive, A1-(ii) says that the
marginal utility is decreasing in the quantity purchased and A1-(iii) says the subscribers
with a higher taste enjoy a higher utility across every q. Assumption A1-(iv) says that the
increase in demand price is diminishing as the taste increases, while A1-(v) says that the
utility function has a nonincreasing absolute risk aversion. Assumption A1-(vi) says that
the cost function is "not too concave" in q. Assumption A1-(vii) says that the conditional
distribution of θ has a nonincreasing inverse hazard rate.
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions A1, the functions (q(·, ), τ(·; )) that solve the mo-
nopolist’s optimization problem satisfy: there exists θ0() ∈ [θ, θ] such that consumers with
θ < θ0() are not served by the provider, and whenever q(·, ) > 0,
τ1 (q (θ, ) ; ) = v (q (θ, ) ; θ, ) , (1)
v(q(θ, ); θ, ) = c1(q(θ, ); ) + v2(q(θ, ); θ, )
1− Φ(θ|)
φ(θ|) . (2)
Equation (1) says that the marginal utility equals the marginal price at the designated
consumption of each subscriber. Equation (2) says that the marginal utility equals the
marginal cost plus a distortion term due to incomplete information.
4 Identification and Estimation
In this section, we first specify the econometric model. We then study the identification of
our model. Finally, we propose a multistep estimation procedure in view of our identification
results.
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4.1 The Econometric Model
We first restrict the marginal utility function in view of the first order condition (1).
Consider the infeasible case in which we observe θ and . For any arbitrary values of θ and
, q(θ, ) in uniquely determined. Therefore, it is not possible to independently vary (q, θ, )
and trace out v0(·; ·, ·) on its 3 dimensional domain. In view of the identification results in
Perrigne and Vuong (2011a,b), the following assumption is made on v(z; θ, ).
Assumption B1: The consumer’s marginal utility function is of the form
v(z; θ, ) = θv0(z),∀θ ∈ [θ, θ],∀ ∈ [, ]
where v0(·) satisfies ∀q ∈ [0,+∞), v0(q) > 0 and v′0(q) < 0.
Now the consumer’s utility function can be written as
∫ q
0
θv0 (z) dz − τ(q; ) = θ
∫ q
0
v0 (z) dz − τ(q; ).
We interpret v0(·) as the base marginal utility function and  as a consumption multiplier.
Recall that  captures the effects of the consumer heterogeneity which is known to both
consumers and the monopolist but unknown to the analyst. Consumers with higher  locate
further away and appreciate more convenience from consuming the same amount of minutes.
For example, consumers who travel more would consume more roaming minutes, which are
of greater convenience than the same amount of local minutes. If we think of q as the base
consumption, the consumption multiplier  measures how much this quantity of consumption
increases in response to a change in his base consumption.
We now consider the cost function. A similar rationale for Assumption B1 applies here.
We need to further restrict the cost function. The following assumption is made on c(q; ).
Assumption B2: The cost function is of the form
c(q; ) =
K + c0(q), if q > 00, if q = 0
where K ≥ 0 and c0(0) = 0.
The term K captures the cost that is triggered by any positive usage. For example,
infrastructure costs stem from keeping mobile phones connected and administration costs
stem from delivering statements. The term c0(q) expresses the cost that is related to
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the amount of services delivered. For example, costs stem from monitoring, recording and
reporting usages. Product customization is costly. That is, delivering service to consumers
locating further away is more costly. For example, the cost of delivering long distance calls is
higher because more cellular sites and mobile-services switching centers are involved and it
requires more financial settlements between the two providers involved. Under Assumption
B1 and B2, (2) can be written as
θv0 (q (θ, )) = c′0(q(θ, )) +
1− Φ (θ|)
φ (θ|) v0 (q (θ, )) . (3)
We further restrict the distribution of consumers’ type.
Assumption B3: θ ⊥ .
Assumption B3 is strong. However, it greatly facilitates the solution of our model. Sim-
ilar assumptions are widely used in the literature. For example, Bernhardt, Liu, and Serfes
(2007) assume the consumer’s unobserved brand name preference is independent of his ob-
served location. Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2010) also assume that the consumer’s
unobservable heterogeneity is independent of his observed characteristics. Moreover, non-
parametric identification of nonlinear nonseparable structural models is often achieved under
the assumption of independence between the model’s latent variables and exogenous vari-
ables. Likewise, independence assumption is the key of our first identification result.
Let f(·) and F (·) denote the density and distribution functions of θ, and let g(·) and G(·)
denote the density and distribution functions of . Under Assumption B3, (3) implies that
q (θ, ) would not depend on . Thus, there exists a function Q(·) such that Q(θ) ≡ q(θ, )
and
θv0(Q(θ)) = c′0(Q(θ)) +
1− F (θ)
f(θ) v0(Q(θ)).
Equation (1) then can be rewritten as
τ1(q(θ, ); )

= θv0(Q(θ)). (4)
We again remark that the right-hand side only depends on θ. Hence, there exists a
function T (·) such that τ(q; ) = T (q). It can be easily verified that τ1(q(θ,);)

= T ′(Q(θ)).
The necessary condition (4) becomes
T ′(Q(θ)) = θv0(Q(θ)).
The following proposition formalizes these results.
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Corollary 1: Under Assumptions B1, B2 and B3, the optimal price schdule offered by the
monopolist should satisfy the following conditions:
(i) There exists θ0 ∈ [θ, θ] such that consumers with θ < θ0 are not served by the provider,
(ii) There exists a pair of functions (Q(·), T (·)) such that: ∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ]
T ′(Q(θ)) = θv0(Q(θ)), (5)
θv0(Q(θ)) = c′0(Q(θ)) +
1− F (θ)
f(θ) v0(Q(θ)), (6)
(iii) ∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ] and ∀ ∈ [, ], q(θ, ) = Q(θ) ,
(iv) ∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ] and ∀ ∈ [, ], τ(q(θ, ); ) = T (q(θ, )).
We can see from (6) that the cutoff taste is defined by
θ0 = min
{
θ ∈ [θ, θ] : T (Q(θ)) ≥ K + c0(Q(θ))
}
, (7)
where T (·) and Q(·) are defined by (5) and (6) and boundary condition
T (Q(θ0)) = K + c0(Q(θ0)). (8)
It is easy to see that ∀K > 0, Q(θ0) > 0.
The variables T and q are the observed payment and consumption. Equations (5) and
(6) characterize the optimal schedule and tariff Q(·) and T (·). Since Q(θ) ≡ q(θ, ) and
q1(θ, ) > 0, we know that Q(·) is strictly increasing in θ. Moreover, Tirole (1988) indicates
that for a given , we have τ1(·; ) > 0 and τ11(·; ) < 0. It is easy to verify that T (·) is strictly
increasing and concave inQ. Therefore, there is a unique strictly increasing mapping between
the unobserved taste θ and the observed bill T , which is the key of our second identification
result. Its concavity is directly related to the magnitude of the asymmetry information
relative to the distribution of consumers’ taste. This is consistent with the observation that
almost all discounts are based on the level of payment in practice.
Before studying the identification of the model primitives, we aggregate the multiple-
dimensional consumptions into a one-dimensional consumption index. We aggregate con-
sumptions of minutes by q = h(qA, qD, qBC , qEF ) and parameterize it in the following way:
Assumption B4: h(·, ·, ·, ·) is of the form
h(qA, qD, qBC , qEF ) = (qA)αA(qD)αD(qBC)αBC (qEF )αEF ,
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where αA, αD, αBC , αEF ≥ 0.
Though we could allow a more general function form, we assume a Cobb-Douglas spec-
ification for simplicity. The Cobb-Douglas specification is widely used in many empirical
studies. For example, Murphy (2007) uses a Cobb-Douglas specification to aggregate char-
acteristics of houses into an one-dimensional quality index. Moreover, first introduced by
Solow (1957), the Cobb-Douglas specification is also extensively used for aggregating pro-
duction function. In Consumption-Based CAPM models, the Cobb-Douglas specification is
used to construct a consumption index for the representative agent. See, e.g., Dunn and
Singleton (1986).
4.2 Identification
We define the game structure and the observables. The model primitives are
[v0(·), F (·), G(·), α,K, c0(·)], which are the base marginal utility function, the taste distribu-
tion, the distribution of location, the weights used to aggregate the multidimensional voice
consumption and cost function. The data provide information on the consumers’ consump-
tion choices and their payment. We denote the observable distribution as G(·, ·, ·, ·, ·), where
the first four arguments are the four-dimensional voice consumption and the last argument
is the payment.
We proceed in several steps. First, we study the identification of the weights to aggregate
different kinds of minute consumptions and the tariff function T (·). Second, we use a strategy
similar to Perrigne and Vuong (2011a) to identify the type distribution and marginal utility
function of consumers.
4.2.1 Identification of α and T (·)
Identification of α implies the identification of the consumption index q given informa-
tion on (qA, qD, qBC , qEF ). In the previous literature, there are mainly three methods to
identify the weights (αA, αD, αBC , αEF ). The first is to parameterize the distribution of the
unobservables. This is not applicable here because we want to identify the distribution of
the unobservables nonparametrically. The second is to find an observable/estimable variable
which is a function of the consumption index. This is not applicable here either since we do
not have additional data. Third, theory may provide some information about the weights.
For example, if consumers were optimizing their choices of voice consumptions, the Cobb-
Douglas specification leads to have the ratio of different consumptions equal to the inverse
of the ratio of their marginal prices. We have shown that this is not the case in Section 2.
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Therefore, it is not possible to identify the weights by equating the ratio of consumptions
with the inverse of the ratio of their prices.
Instead, we explore the restrictions we put on consumers’ taste and location to identify
the weights. Assumption B4 implies that
T = T ((qA)αA(qD)αD(qBC)αBC (qEF )αEF × ),
where T (·) is strictly increasing and concave.
Considering the inverse function T−1 gives
T−1(T ) = (qA)αA(qD)αD(qBC)αBC (qEF )αEF × .
In addition, the natural logarithm leads to
αA log(qA) + αD log(qD) + αBC log(qBC) + αEF log(qEF ) = log(T−1(T ))− log(),
which can be written as
α′Y = Λ(X) + e, (9)
where Y ≡ (log(qA), log(qD), log(qBC), log(qEF ))′, Λ(·) ≡ log(T−1(·)), X ≡ T and e ≡
− log(). We denote Y l ≡ log(ql), where l ∈ {A,D,BC,EF}.
We motivate the identification of α and T by comparing our econometric model with
two most related ones: The transformation model and the single index model. We remark
that (i)  is independent of θ, and (ii) T only depends on θ. Thus log() is independent
of log(T−1(T )). On one hand, our model does not specify the relationship between ql and
. That is, log() is not necessarily independent of ql. Thus we cannot transform (9) into
a transformation model.8 On the other hand, if the αs were known, we can calculate the
scalar dependent variable on the left hand side and our model becomes a degenerated single
index model.9
Note that (9) continues to hold if α, Λ, and e are replaced by cα, cΛ, and ce for any
c > 0. It also holds if Λ and e are replaced by Λ + c and e − c for any c ∈ R. Therefore,
location and scale normalizations are needed for identification. Moreover, the coefficients αs
are not identified if there is perfect multicollinearity among the elements in Y . The following
8The transformation model is Λ(Y ) = X ′β + e, where Y is a scalar dependent variable, Λ(·) is a strictly
increasing function, X is a vector of explanatory variables, β is the vector of corresponding coefficients, and
e is an unobserved error term independent of X.
9The semiparametric single index regression model is Y = Λ(X ′β) + e, where Y is a scalar depen-
dent variable, Λ(·) is an unknown link function, X is a vector of explanatory variables, β is the vector of
corresponding coefficients, and e is an unobserved error term independent of X.
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assumption formalizes these observations.
Assumption C1:
(i) αA + αD + αBC + αEF = 1,
(ii) E[log()|θ] = 0,
(iii) There exists a triple (t1, t2, t3) such that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
E[e∂Y A
∂t1
] E[e∂Y D
∂t1
] E[e∂Y BC
∂t1
] E[e∂Y EF
∂t1
]
E[e∂Y A
∂t2
] E[e∂Y D
∂t2
] E[e∂Y BC
∂t2
] E[e∂Y EF
∂t2
]
E[e∂Y A
∂t3
] E[e∂Y D
∂t3
] E[e∂Y BC
∂t3
] E[e∂Y EF
∂t3
]
1 1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
6= 0. (10)
Assumption C1-(i) says that the aggregation function has constant return to scale. As-
sumption C1-(ii) says that log() is mean-independent of θ, which is needed for the identifica-
tion of T (·). Assumption C1-(iii) restricts how  and ql are correlated. Violation of it would
lead to nonidentification. For instance, we assume that Y A = k1Y D + k2Y BC + k3Y EF , then
the left-hand side of equation (10) equals 0 because the vector of column 1 can be written
as a linear combination of vectors of the other columns. In this case, α is not identified. In
fact, for any structure with α = (αA, αD, αBC , αEF ), we can define another structure with the
same primitives except for the weights, (say) α˜ = (0, αAk1 + αD, αAk2 + αBC , αAk3 + αEF ).
The two structures leads to the same observable G(·, ·, ·, ·, ·).
Proposition 2: Under Assumption C1, α and T (·) are identified.
To conclude this subsection, we compare our aggregation method with the quality-
adjusted quantity method used in Perrigne and Vuong (2011a). In Perrigne and Vuong
(2011a), in addition to quantitative characteristics, some qualitative characteristics of the
plans are observed by the analyst. Since the publisher does not use different qualities to
discriminate among firms, they construct a quality-adjusted quantity index from one of the
price schedules. In our model, locations of consumers are not observed by the analyst.
However, for consumers with the same observed consumptions, their different payments re-
flects their different locations. Identification of the aggregation parameters comes from the
independence between payment and the "demeanded" consumption index.
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4.2.2 Identification of K, c0(·), v0(·), F (·) and G(·)
In this subsection, we first note that further restriction on the cost function is necessary
for identification. With (5) and (6), it is impossible to uncover the three functions Q(·),
v0(·) and c0(·). As in Perrigne and Vuong (2011a), the marginal cost function is identified
at Q(θ). While no further restriction on the cost function is needed for the identification of
the other model primitives in their paper, it is not the case here. Due to its separability, our
cost function is involved in (5) and (6) everywhere on the support of Q. In view of this, we
restrict the cost function to be linear.
Assumption D1: c0(·) = γ × ·, where γ > 0.
Under Assumption D1, we can show the identification of K and γ once α and T (·) are
identified.
Lemma 1: The parameters K and γ are identified. In particular,
γ = T ′(T−1(t)),
K = t0 − γT−1(t0),
where t0 ≡ T (Q(θ0)) and t ≡ T (Q(θ)).
Now, we turn to the identification of v0, F (·) and G(·). We use a strategy similar
to Perrigne and Vuong (2011a). They exploit the known increasing one-to-one mapping
between the consumer’s type and consumption. Since consumers’ consumption choices are
observed, they will be able to recover their types. Hence, one can identify the distribution of
consumer types from the distribution of quantity consumed. The identification of the utility
function arises from the FOCs that the optimal price schedule should satisfy. In our case,
the first order conditions (5) and (6) define a unique strictly increasing mapping from θ to Q.
However, Q is not observed by the analyst. Instead we exploit the unique strictly increasing
mapping between θ and T since the latter is observed. Specifically, we rewrite the necessary
conditions (5) and (6) as follows.
Lemma 2: ∀θm ∈ [θ0, θ], the necessary conditions can be rewritten as
v0(Q) =
T ′(Q)
θm
[1−H(T (Q))]1− γT ′(q) exp
{
−γ
∫ Q
Q(θ0)
T ′′(x)
T ′(x)2 log[1−H(T (x))]dx
}
, (11)
θ(Q) = θm[1−H(T (Q))]
γ
T ′(Q)−1 exp
{
γ
∫ Q
Q(θ0)
T ′′(x)
T ′(x)2 log[1−H(T (x))]dx
}
, (12)
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where H(·) is the distribution of consumers’ payments.
Notice that everything on the right-hand side of (11) and (12) are identified except θm.
Lemma 1 suggests that any normalization of θm ∈ [θ0, θ] leads to the identification of the
consumers’ marginal utility function and taste distribution.
Assumption D2: θ0 = 1.
Under Assumption D2, v0(·) can be interpreted as the marginal utility function for the
type (1, 1). By Proposition 2, for any t ∈ [t0, t], Q is identified, and the marginal utility and
taste can be obtained using (11) and (12). Thus, the location of a consumer with payment
t and consumptions (qA, qD, qBC , qEF ) can be identified as,
 = Q(qA)αA(qD)αD(qBC)αBC (qEF )αEF . (13)
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 3: Under Assumptions D1 and D2, the marginal utility function v0(·) and
the consumers’ taste distribution F (·) are identified on [Q0, Q] and [θ0, θ], respectively. In
addition, the location distribution G(·) is identified on [, ].
4.3 Estimation
We observe the subscribers’ consumptions of A, D, (B +C) and (E +F ) and their total
bill in May 2009. We denote them as
{
(qAi , qDi , qBCi , qEFi ), ti)
}N
i=1
. The term ti is the total bill
paid by subscriber i. Our semiparametric identification result of Section 4.2 leads naturally
to a semiparametric procedure for estimation. We propose a multistep estimation procedure.
STEP 1: From the observed consumptions and corresponding payments, we estimate α
and T (·). This allows us to compute
{
Q̂i
}N
i=1
and the pseudo locations {̂i}Ni=1 using (13).
STEP 2: In view of Lemma 2, we estimate γ and K by replacing t0 by tmin ≡ mini=1,...,N ti
and t by tmax ≡ maxi=1,...,N ti. This allows us to obtain an estimate for the marginal payoff
v0(·) and to construct a sample of pseudo tastes using (11) and (12). We then estimate the
taste and location densities by using a kernel estimator.
We provide below detailed information on every step.10
10The asymptotic properties of these estimators will be collected in the supplemental web appendix.
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4.3.1 Estimation of α and T (·)
To estimate α, we partition the range of payment into B bins and define dummy variables
Db(t) = 1 if t ∈ b and 0 otherwise, where b ∈ {1, . . . ,B}. For any value of b ∈ {1, . . . ,B},
we have
α′E
{
Db(T )
[
(Y − E (Y |T ))(Y − E (Y |T ))′ −
B∑
b=1
E {Db(T )[(Y − E (Y |T ))(Y − E (Y |T ))′]}
]}
α = 0.
Thus, the estimate α̂ is obtained by minimizing a least squares function:
min
α
B∑
b=1
α′
 1
Nb
∑
i:ti∈b
(yi − Ê (yi|ti))(yi − Ê (yi|ti))′ − 1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi − Ê (yi|ti))(yi − Ê (yi|ti))′)
α

2
,
where Nb is the number of observations in bin b, yi ≡ (log(qAi ), log(qDi ), log(qBCi ), log(qEFi ))′
and Ê (yi|ti) is the conditional expection of the consumption bundle at ti, which can be
estimated using the usual nonparametric regression estimator
Ê (yli|ti) =
∑N
k=1 y
l
kK( ti−tkht )∑N
k=1K( ti−tkht )
,
for any l ∈ {A,D,BC,EF}, whereK(·) is a symmetric kernel function with compact support
and ht is some bandwidth.
We then use the constrained smoothing estimator with regression splines proposed by
Dole (1999) to approximate T−1(·), which is strictly increasing and convex. The approxima-
tion spline proposed for strictly increasing and convex functions is
ψ(x; β, δ) = β0 + β1x+
n∑
j=0
δjsj(x),
where β ≡ (β0, β1) ≥ 0, δ ≡ (δ0, . . . , δn) ≥ 0, n is the number of interior knots and sj(x) are
cubic spline functions.11
For given (α̂, β, δ), we can construct a pseudo sample of e ≡ − log()
êi(α̂, β, δ) =
(
α̂A log(qAi ) + α̂D log(qDi ) + α̂BC log(qBCi ) + α̂EF log(qEFi )
)
− log
(
ψ(ti; β, δ)
)
,
where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and N is the number of observations.
11See the appendix for further implementation details of the b-splines.
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Our estimate of (β, δ) solves:
min
(β,δ)
SSE(α̂, β, δ) ≡
N∑
i=1
[
êi(α̂, β, δ)
]2
, (14)
where β ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0. We denote the corresponding estimate as (β̂, δ̂).
With the estimate of (β, δ), the tariff function is estimated by T̂ (·) = ψ−1(·; β̂, δ̂). We
can also calculate an estimate of Q for each payment using
Q̂(t) = ψ(b; β̂, δ̂) = β̂0 + β̂1t+
n∑
j=0
δ̂jsj(t),
where t ∈ [t0, t], and the sj(·)s are known cubic spline functions.
Second, with the estimate of α, we can also estimate the consumption index qi ≡ q(θi, i)
of consumer i using
q̂i = (qAi )α̂
A(qDi )α̂
D(qBCi )α̂
BC (qEFi )α̂
EF
,
where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Third, with the estimate of Qi and qi, we can estimate the location of consumer i using
̂i =
Q̂i
(qAi )α̂
A(qDi )α̂
D(qBCi )α̂
BC (qEFi )α̂
EF
,
where Q̂i = ψ(ti; β̂, δ̂). Hence, a pseudo sample of locations can be constructed, {̂i}Ni=1.
4.3.2 Estimation of v0(·), F (·) and G(·)
We estimate γ by γ̂ = 1
ψ′(tmax;β̂,δ̂)
, and K by K̂ = tmin − γψ(tmin; β̂, δ̂). We estimate Qmax
by Qmax = ψ(tmax; β̂, δ̂). We estimate H(·) as the empirical distribution of payment,
Ĥ(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
1(ti ≤ t),
where 1(·) is an indicator function and t ∈ [0, tmax].
The estimate for v0(·) is given by
v̂0(Q) =

T̂ ′(Q)
ξ̂(Q)
, if Q ∈ (0, Qmax)
limx↑Qmax v̂0(x), if Q ∈ (Qmax, Q(θ))
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and the estimate of θ(·) by
θ̂(Q) = ξ̂(Q),
where
ξ̂(Q) = [1− Ĥ(ψ−1(Q; β̂, δ̂))]
γ̂
T̂ ′(q)
−1
exp
{
γ̂
∫ Q
Q(θ0)
T̂ ′′(x)
T̂ ′(x)2
log[1− Ĥ(ψ−1(x; β̂, δ̂))]dx
}
.
In the above equations, ψ−1(·; β̂, δ̂) is the inverse function of ψ(·; β̂, δ̂). T̂ ′(·), T̂ ′′(·) are the
first and second derivative of ψ−1(·; β̂, δ̂). Hence, for any Q ∈ [Q(θ0), Q(θ)], we can estimate
the marginal utility and taste. A pseudo sample of taste can be constructed as
{
θ̂i
}N
i=1
.
Finally, with the pseudo sample of taste and location,
{
(θ̂i, ̂i)
}N
i=1
, we estimate the
truncated density of taste and the density of location by using kernel estimators
f̂ ∗(θ) = 1
Nhθ
N∑
i=1
K
(θ − θ̂i
hθ
)
,
ĝ() = 1
Nh
N∑
i=1
K
(− ̂i
h
)
,
for (θ, ) ∈ [θ0, θ] × [, ], where K(·) is a symmetric kernel function with compact support,
hθ and h are some bandwidths.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the estimation results and examine several counterfactual ex-
periments. The minimum of consumption and payment are both close to 0. Our estimate
of K and Q(θ0) are K̂ = 0 and Q̂(θ0) = 0, respectively. Therefore, no consumer is ex-
cluded. This stems from the fact that we only consider voice consumption in this paper.
The population can be understood as those who are already subscribed to this firm.
The weights in the Cobb-Douglas aggregation function are α̂ = (0.426, 0, 0.381, 0.193).
It is not surprising that α̂D = 0 because incoming calls are free when the subscriber is in his
home city. The estimated marginal tariff function T̂ ′(·) is displayed in Figure 1-(Up-Left).
We obtain γ̂ = 1.026. The estimated marginal utility function is displayed in Figure 1-
(Up-Right). We use a triweight kernel and a rule-of-thumb bandwidth to estimate the taste
and location density functions. θ̂i ∈ [1, 4.376] and ̂i ∈ [0.092, 4.242].12 The estimated taste
density is displayed in Figure 1-(Bottom-Left). It is a decreasing density. The estimated
12We use a reflection method to correct boundary effect. Since the inclusion of some unusually high values
skews the estimated location density to the right severely, we also trim the upper 2.5% pseudo locations.
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density reveals substantial heterogeneity among subscribers in their taste for mobile voice
service. The estimated location density is displayed in Figure 1-(Bottom-Right). It is a
unimodal density that is skewed right. We note that the standard deviation of the estimated
taste is 0.682 while it is 1.068 for the estimated locations. Thus, subscribers are more
heterogeneous in their location than taste. Omitting complete information when studying
the interaction between mobile service provider and its subscribers would lead to a significant
bias.
With the estimates at hand, we can perform some counterfactuals. With the esti-
mated density functions of consumers’ willingness to pay and locations, we can estimate
the provider’s profit when he offers a linear price schedule. That is, T (Q) = p × Q. The
optimal linear price would be 2.758. Figure 2 presents the allocations of Q for subscribers
with different taste under the three schemes: first-best, nonlinear pricing, and linear pricing.
Both allocations under nonlinear and linear pricing are less than the first-best allocation.
The nonlinear pricing allocation converges to the first-best allocation because subscribers
with the strongest taste are served efficiently. We then calculate the total production, the
provider’s profit and social welfare under three schemes, respectively. Table 4 presents the
results. Nonlinear pricing achieves nearly 90% of the first-best social welfare. It is especially
interesting to compare nonlinear pricing with linear pricing. Note that a necessary condi-
tion for nonlinear pricing to increase social welfare is that sufficiently more are produced.
The total production increases 82% under nonlinear pricing. However, the social welfare
only increases by 23%. This is due to the distribution effect of price discrimination which
reduces the welfare gain. Note that a necessary condition for maximizing welfare with given
output is to sell at the same price. Under nonlinear pricing, a lower average price and more
service are provided to consumers with high taste. Thus, the social welfare only increases
by a small amount. Nonlinear prices can increase profits and efficiency when firms cannot
tell customers’ willingness to pay. Due to asymmetric information, 50% of "second-best"
social welfare is left "on the table" in order to induce consumers with high taste to buy large
quantities.
Our second counterfactual considers product customization. In our model, product cus-
tomization is costly and also affects the utility of subscribers. We now study the case in
which it does not affect subscribers’ utility but is still costly. That is, v(z; θ, ) = θv0(z) and
c(q; ) = γ̂q. Equation (1) and (2) now become
τ1 (q (θ, ) ; ) = θv0 (q (θ, )) ,
θv0 (q (θ, )) = γ+ v0 (q (θ, ))
1− F (θ)
f(θ) .
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We note that subscribers with type (θ, ) such that γ̂
θ− 1−F̂ (θ)
f̂(θ)
≥ v̂0(0) will be excluded. The
excluded population in the type space is displayed in Figure 3, which accounts for 20% of the
subscribers. This has important implication in practice. The provider would rather exclude
some subscribers if customizing service is costly but not useful to subscribers. Universal
service regulation should be made if the monopolist’s optimal exclusion decision greatly
harms social welfare.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a structural model to explain the observed voice consumptions and
payments in mobile service industry. Two important features of the data are incorporated
in the model. First, discounts are given based on the level of payment. Second, consumers
may have different payments even if they consume the same amount of minutes. Our model
assumes that consumers are heterogeneous along two dimensions: location and willingness
to pay. The former is exogenous and common knowledge to the subscriber and the provider
while the latter is known only to the subscriber. A one-to-one mapping between the willing-
ness to pay and payment explains the first feature. Difference in locaions which is unknown
to the analyst explains the second feature. Moreover, we propose a new method to aggregate
multiple-dimensional variables into one-dimensional index, which does not require additional
data on a variable which is a function of the index nor making parametric assumptions on
the unobservable variables. Empirical results show that both observed and unobserved het-
erogeneity are both important. Moreover, if costly product customization does not affect
subscribers’ utility, 20% of subscribers would be not served by the provider.
Our results rely on the assumption that consumers know their types well, which is sup-
ported by our data. However, as noted in Miravete (2002), uncertainty about future con-
sumption at the time of plan choice may be significant. Examples include cases where there
is a switching cost or a long term contract. A natural extension of our model is to consider
the case in which consumers have uncertainty when choosing plans. A two-stage decision
process model can be entertained. Another extension of interest is to consider both voice and
short message service (SMS) consumption. Relying on Armstrong (1996), Luo, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2011) generalize the methodology in Perrigne and Vuong (2011a) and the techniques
developed here to the multiproduct case and apply them to the empirical analysis of voice
and SMS in the mobile phone industry.
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Appendix A: Proofs
This appendix gives the proofs of the propositions and lemmas stated in Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof follows Sundararajan (2004).
Proof of Proposition 2: We observe the joint distribution of (Y A, Y D, Y BC , Y EF , T ). We
denote α ≡ (αA, αD, αBC , αEF )′, Λ(·) ≡ log(T−1(·)), e ≡ − log() and Y l(T, e) ≡ log(ql(T, e))
where l ∈ {A,D,BC,EF}. We want to identify α, Λ(·) and the distribution of , G(·). Our
model does not provide any information about Y l(·) except the following relationship:∑
l∈{A,D,BC,EF}
αlY l(T, e) = Λ(T ) + e,
where Λ(·) is strictly increasing, αl ≥ 0 and ∑l∈{A,D,BC,EF} αl = 1.
In the first step, we prove that α is identified. Our identification result of α is based on
the following observations:
(i) For any given payment t ∈ [0, t], the variability in ∑l∈{A,D,BC,EF} αlY l(t, e) equals the
variation in e.
(ii) ∀t ∈ [0, t], E[e2|T = t] = σ2e .
which imply that
Var {α′Y − Λ(T )|T = t} = σ2e . (15)
To prove the identification of α, we need to show that there exists a unique α such that
(15) is satisfied. To see this, note that E [α′Y |T = t] = Λ(t) implies that (15) can be rewriten
as
E

[ ∑
l∈{A,D,BC,EF}
αlY l(t, e)− Λ(t)
]2 = σ2e .
where the expectation is taken on e.
Taking partial derivative with respective to t and using Leibniz’s rule gives
∫
e
[ ∑
l∈{A,D,BC,EF}
αl
∂Y l
∂t
− Λ′(t)
]
ge(e)de = 0,
where ge(·) is the density function of e. E [e|T ] = 0 implies E [eΛ′(t)] = 0. Thus∫
e
( ∑
l∈{A,D,BC,EF}
αl
∂Y l
∂t
)
ge(e)de = 0,
which can be rewritten as ∑
l∈{A,D,BC,EF}
αlE
[
e
∂Y l
∂t
]
= 0, (16)
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where the expectation is taken on e.
Supplemented by∑l∈{A,D,BC,EF} αl = 1, (16) evaluated at t1, t2 and t3 provides four linear
equations in the four unknowns (αA, αD, αBC , αEF ). By C3, these equations can be solved
for an unique solution. Hence, α is identified.
In the second step, we prove that Λ(·) is also identified. Let Y ≡ ∑l∈{A,D,BC,EF} αlY l
and E [Y|T = t; Λ(·), G(·)] denote the conditional expectation of Y given T = t, for the
distribution generated by (Λ(·), G(·)). Suppose that (Λ˜(·), G˜(·)) and (Λ̂(·), Ĝ(·)) generate
the same joint distribution of (Y A, Y D, Y BC , Y EF , T ), and Λ˜(t#) 6= Λ̂(t#). Because α is
identified, they generate the same joint distribution of (Y , T ). Thus, since
E[Y|T = t#; Λ˜(·), G˜(·)] = Λ˜(t#)
E[Y|T = t#; Λ̂(·), Ĝ(·)] = Λ̂(t#)
and both functions are continuous at t#, it follows that
FY|T (·; Λ˜(·), G˜(·)) 6= FY|T (·; Λ̂(·), Ĝ(·)).
which contradicts the fact that the two structures generate the same joint distrubtion of
(Y , T ). Hence, Λ(·) is identified. Since T (·) is a known functional of Λ(·), it is also identified.
Proof of Lemma 1: On one hand, Q(θ) is identified because
T (Q(θ)) = t,
where T (·) is identified by Proposition 2 and t is observed.
On the other hand, evaluating (5) and (6) at θ = θ gives
T ′(Q(θ)) = γ.
where T ′(·) is identified given that T (·) is.
Therefore, γ is identified as T ′(T−1(t)). The identification of K follows from t0 =
T (Q(θ0)) = K + γQ(θ0).
Proof of Lemma 2: In the first step, we consider the infeasible case in which Q is observed.
Therefore T (·) is also observed. Denote the distribution of Q as GQ(·). Following the same
lines as in Perrigne and Vuong (2011a), we can express the marginal utility function v0(·) and
θ(·) as functions of T (·), γ and GQ(·). For any value θm ∈ [θ0, θ], the necessary conditions
can be rewritten as
v0(Q) =
T ′(Q)
θm
[1−GQ(Q)]1−
γ
T ′(q) exp
{
−γ
∫ Q
Q(θ0)
T ′′(x)
T ′(x)2 log[1−GQ(x)]dx
}
, (17)
θ(Q) = θm[1−GQ(Q)]
γ
T ′(Q)−1 exp
{
γ
∫ Q
Q(θ0)
T ′′(x)
T ′(x)2 log[1−GQ(x)]dx
}
. (18)
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In the second step, we consider the case in which Q is not observed. We note that
∀Qm ∈ [Q(θ0), Q(θ)],
GQ(Qm) = Pr {Q ≤ Qm} = Pr {T ≤ T (Qm)} ≡ H(T (Qm)).
Therefore, replacing GQ(·) with H(T (·)) in (17) and (18) yields (11) and (12).
Proof of Proposition 3: When Λ(·) is identified, we can also identify G(·) because
G(z) = Pr {log() ≤ log(z)} = Pr {e ≥ − log(z)} = Pr {Y − Λ(T ) ≥ − log(z)} .
where the joint distribution of (Y , T ) is identified.
Regarding the identification of v0(·) and F (·), we follow Perrigne and Vuong (2011a).
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Appendix B: Estimation of α and T (·)
This appendix describes how we estimate α and the implementation details of the b-
splines to estimate T (·).
To estimate α, we first use a triweight kernel and rule-of-thumb bandwidths to estimate
Ê[log(qli)|ti], where l ∈ {A,D,BC,EF}. Second, we partition [0, tmax] into 50 bins using
empirical quantiles
{
b
50
}50
b=1
as cut points. We trim several bins on the boundaries because a
kernel is used to estimate Ê[log(qli)|ti]. The estimate of α minimizes the "adjusted" objective
function:
min
α
50−4∑
b=3
α′
 1
Nb
∑
i:ti∈b
(yi − Ê(yi|ti))(yi − Ê(yi|ti))′ − N(N∗)2
N∗∑
i=1
(yi − Ê(yi|ti))(yi − Ê(yi|ti))′)
α

2
,
where N∗ is the total number of observations in bins included.
The adjustement is necessary because σ2e is estimated differently after trimming. In
particular, note that σ2ePb = E {Db(T )[α′(Y − E (Y |T ))(Y − E (Y |T ))′α]} implies that
σ2e =
( 50−4∑
b=3
E {Db(T )[α′(Y − E (Y |T ))(Y − E (Y |T ))′α]}
)
/
( 50−4∑
b=3
Pb
)
=
50∑
b=1
E {Db(T )[α′(Y − E (Y |T ))(Y − E (Y |T ))′α]} .
To estimate T (·), we approximate its inverse function with splines and find the optimal
approximate spline that solves (14). Note that T−1(·) is increasing and convex. We use the
constrained smoothing with regression splines proposed in Dole (1999) to approximate it:
ψ(x; β, δ) = β0 + β1x+
n∑
j=0
δjsj(x),
where β ≡ (β0, β1) ≥ 0, δ ≡ (δ0, . . . , δn) ≥ 0 and n is the number of interior knots.
The term s0(x) is defined as
s0(x) =

0 if x ∈ (−∞, k(1)](
x− k(1)
)3
/6
(
k(2) − k(1)
)
if x ∈
[
k(1), k(2)
]
x2/2− x
(
k(1) + k(2)
)
/2 +
(
k(2) − k(1)
)2
/6 + k(1)k(2)/2 if x ∈
[
k(2), k(N−1)
]
(
x− k(N)
)3
/6
(
k(N−1) − k(N)
)
+ b10x+ b00 if x ∈
[
k(N−1), k(N)
]
b10x+ b00 if x ∈ [k(N),∞)
where
b10 =
(
k(N) + k(N−1) − k(2) − k(1)
)
/2
b00 =
((
k(2) − k(1)
)2 − (k(N−1) − k(N))2 + 3k(2)k(1) − 3k(N)k(N−1)) /6,
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with k(j) denoting the j’th order statistic of the observed bills (j = 1, 2, N − 1, N).
For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, sj(x) is defined as
sj (x) =

0 if x ∈ (−∞, kj−1]
(x− kj−1)3 /6 (kj − ki−1) if x ∈ [kj−1, kj]
(x− kj+1)3 /6 (kj − kj+1) + b1x+ b0 if x ∈ [kj, kj+1]
b1x+ b0 if x ∈ [kj+1,∞)
where
b1 = (kj+1 − kj−1) /2
b0 =
(
(kj − kj−1)2 − (kj − kj+1)2 + 3 (kj+1 − kj−1) kj
)
/6,
when j − 1 = 0, we set kj−1 = 0, and when j + 1 > n, we set kj+1 = 1000.
We remark that s0(x) is the double integral of the following B-spline
B0 (x) =

(
x− k(1)
)
/
(
k(1) − k(2)
)
if x ∈
[
k(1), k(2)
]
1 if x ∈
[
k(2), k(N−1)
](
x− k(N)
)
/
(
k(N) − k(N−1)
)
if x ∈
[
k(N−1), k(N)
]
0 otherwise
and sj(x) is the double integral of the following B-spline
Bj (x) =

(x− kj−1) / (kj − kj−1) if x ∈ [kj−1, kj]
(x− kj+1) / (kj − kj+1) if x ∈ [kj, kj+1]
0 otherwise
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Appendix C: Graphs
Figure 1: Estimation Results
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Figure 2: Q under First-best, Nonlinear and Linear Pricing
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Figure 3: Excluded Subscribers
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
θ
²
30
Appendix D: Tables
Table 1: Different Kinds of Calls
When the subscriber is
at local in home province out of home province
Outgoing Calls A B C
Incoming Calls D E F
Table 2: Summary Statisticsa
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bill 182.49 125.07 3 997.30
A 518.87 431.88 0 4613
D 473.44 429.41 0 9713
BC 114.31 230.37 0 9923
EF 72.34 162.91 0 3071
Days since Subscriptionb 845.38 825.18 -22 6553
a The number of observations N > 20, 000. We utilize a random
sample of 10,000 observations in our estimation.
b The number of days between the date when the consumer first
subscribed to the provider and April 30, 2009. The minimum is
negative because some consumers subscribed after April 30, 2009.
Table 3: Product Customization
Bill ∈ Variable # Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(175,225] TotalMin 0.14×N 924.88 274.44 17 4103Bill 0.14×N 197.29 13.81 175.02 225
(275,325] TotalMin 0.06×N 1356.49 399.28 41 3698Bill 0.06×N 297.38 13.55 275.02 325
(375,425] TotalMin 0.02×N 1817.58 603.19 24 5583Bill 0.02×N 397.47 13.85 375.04 425
(475,525] TotalMin 0.01×N 2135.45 681.21 70 4878Bill 0.01×N 498.81 14.13 475.05 524.9
Table 4: Counterfactual Experiments
First-best Nonlinear Pricing Linear Pricing
Total Production 155.27 84.90 46.66
Firm Profit 214.44 93.77 80.80
Social Welfare 214.44 191.33 155.12
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